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(This essay is based on a paper written for the Association for Scottish Historical Studies 1996 conference on the theme of the ‘Government and Mis-government
of Scotland’.)
There has been an implicit distinction in the literature which has grown so in the last quarter century concerning Scottish politics from the Union to the Scottish
Reform Act of 1832 which has been understood by most of those who have contributed to it, but has not always by many of those who have read it. There have
now been a substantial number of published monographs and unpublished doctoral theses on the political management of Scotland during the eighteenth
century.[1] This work appears to me often to be considered as the same as work on the Scottish electoral system from 1707-1832 begun by William Ferguson and
subject to comparatively fewer additions in recent years.[2] While the first body of work implicitedly considers the nature of the constitutional relationship
between England and Scotland as abstract entities after the parliamentary union of 1707, the second area of study is really concerned with identifying an
unwritten Scottish constitution and demonstrating how it affected politics and the law after Scotland lost an independent political forum as well as its own
legislature through the union. Only Ferguson really has undertaken this work in genuine depth, while others of us (I include myself) have contributed specific
studies of particular political contexts[3] that complement and provide detail for the framework Ferguson erected in his unpublished thesis, parts of which have
reached print, but perhaps not as many readers as they should.[4]
One reason for this may be that even in Scotland there has been a reluctance to concede that if there was an ancient Scottish constitution, it had any
relevance or worth after 1707. Dr. Ferguson makes clear that by the third quarter of the eighteenth century things were very wrong indeed in terms of the
Scottish constitution, and reforms were needed urgently, but this does not imply that the system had been corrupt and unregenerative for time out of mind.[5]
After all, weren't the constitutions of England and Wales, and of Ireland, equally corrupt and in need of reform by 1775?[6] Wasn't that the cause of the American
Revolution, which was a war fought out of conviction that the English constitution had become corrupt (partly through Scottish influence)?[7] It took just as long
for reform to be effected in England, Wales and Ireland as in Scotland, and that reform when it came proved to be just as flawed and incomplete elsewhere in
the British Isles as in Scotland. Dr. Ferguson's point, as I understand it, has been that reform in Scotland suffered additionally from lack of understanding of the
historical origins of what was being reformed.[8]
One indication of this attitude can be seen in the recurring references to the fact that there were far fewer electors in Scottish constituencies than there were
in England and Wales, or Ireland for that matter. The reasoning behind this appears to be that if politics in Britain and Ireland was corrupt and
unrepresentative, they were even more corrupt and unrepresentative in Scotland because there were far fewer voters.[9] There is a variant of this approach in
Irish historiography, where the Irish Parliament which voted itself out of existence in favour of union with Britain in 1801 is held to lack national legitimacy
because the Roman Catholic majority of the country was excluded for the most part from the constitution it represented.[10]
One articulate exponent of this point of view was the late Dr. P.W.J. Riley of the University of Manchester, who recorded his views in a remarkable series of
reviews once book length studies began to appear on eighteenth-century Scottish politics during the 1980's. The subject of the commentary is work which
relates to the relationship of Scotland to England within the union, but the polemic is directed at the nature of the Scottish constitution before 1707 and
whether it represented anything worthwhile in terms of Scottish politics and culture. Thus in Dr. Riley's review of Rosalind Mitchison's survey of Scottish History
between 1625-1745, Lordship to Patronage, the author is rebuked in the following terms:
She has been unable wholly to abandon the idea of a Scottish Parliament as the authentic voice of the nation, whilst clearly being aware of the
importance of 'high politics', and consequently of the fact that Parliament spoke with nothing but the voice of the dominant clique for the time
being.[11]
In another review, this time of Bruce Lenman's Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, very similar sentiments are expressed:
He seemingly entertains no illusions concerning the greed and acquisitiveness of the Scottish nobility and clan leadership. Indeed, he appears to
relish their brazen pursuit of self-interest.... However, despite the evidence, Mr. Lenman seems unable wholly to accept the view he is expressing.
He imputes to some of these people the most extraordinary motives. We hear of Atholl's conscientious opposition to proposals for an incorporating
union' (p.70), and with reference to Fraser [of Lovat], of 'that stalwart Scottish nationalism which was perhaps Simon's strongest emotion next to
megalomania' (p.163). Such statements would have moved eighteenth-century Scotsmen to hollow mirth .... Any sign of anti-English, anti-court or
anti-revenue feeling he interprets as Scottish patriotism and opposition to an English take-over, whereas the people he writes of were
anti-everything but themselves.[12]
This theme was a continuation of ideas first expressed in Riley's review of my own book, The People Above: Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-
Century Scotland, which he claimed undermined the idea of Scottish nationalism:
This book gives support to the view that Scottish nationalism of the kind now familiar to us is really a product of the Union, being an assertion of
'Scottishness' within the United Kingdom. It was no accident that the post-war upsurge of nationalism coincided with the collapse of the United
Kingdom's imperial status and the consequent shrinkage of a traditional field of Scottish endeavour. Then Scottish interest in the United Kingdom
began to be appreciated for what it had been - a mere transference. If the Scots in general tend to shy away from the idea of independence it is
not because they like it inside the Union but because the thought of what they might find outside is a little daunting.[13]
What we have before us then, is Dr. Riley's exegesis on what he saw as the general implications of the three detailed monographs he published on Scottish
government and politics from 1688-1727 (and the articles which accompanied them). The picture which emerges is a far from flattering one. A selfish feudal
elite gained a degree of political independence and used it to monopolise the resources of a small country and later to gain access to the profits of expanding
empire. As a group they had nothing to do with anything which might be considered a Scottish nation, although the review of Murdoch from 1983 actually does
make a link between the landed elite of the past and the Scottish electorate post 1945. Dr. Riley shares the historiographical outlook espoused by Tom Johnston
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in his early days when he published Our Noble Families as a diatribe against a Scottish nobility and gentry he wished to eliminate from Scottish History.[14]
Yet I offer this not to condemn Dr. Riley but to praise him for being explicit about his reaction to the idea of a Scottish constitutional history which might be
independent of that of England. Those interested in Scottish History are in Dr. Riley's debt for what we can learn from the careful scholarship he published,
without being compelled to accept his own conclusions regarding the interpretation of that scholarship.[15] One can only hope that as many of those interested
in English History read his work as those interested in Scottish History. In many ways E.P. Thompson's refusal to include Scotland and Wales in his Making of the
English Working Class, although declared a mark of respect, indicates a refusal to engage with England's shared history as part of Britain in a way which is far
more damaging than Patrick Riley's scepticism about the public virtue of the Scottish nobility.[16] Thompson's last article in Past and Present, on the radical
John Thelwell in England and Scotland, is a welcome indication that he came to change his mind.[17]
The challenge implicit in Patrick Riley's work, however, is to decide whether, in Scotland's case, a constitutional history different from that of England indicates
political if not cultural inferiority, a condition in which Scotland is not alone. Much of the world is not England, although this does not appear to occur to some
English historians interested in British history.[18] The effects of the acceptance of this perspective can be seen at the end of the eighteenth century, when
Scottish radicals and reformers were almost united in their rejection of pursuing reform or revolution in a genuinely national context, despite some references
to the Claim of Right passed by the Scottish Convention Parliament of 1689.[19] From 1784, if not before, right through to 1832 and beyond, Scottish nationalism
was associated in Scotland with the feudal privileges of the Scottish landed class. Their constitution and their laws were part of the Old Regime.[20] The price
which Scots who rejected this history paid was the concession, however subconsciously, of the superiority of other histories to their own.
In terms of constitution and the law, the possibility of Scotland having its own tradition has been difficult for many English scholars to assimilate, although not
so difficult for Americans or a New Zealander like John Pocock.[21] Ferguson's work has shown how unique Scottish institutions were undermined by lack of a
forum to enable them to adjust to changing times. The English-dominated House of Lords did not understand Scots Law and could care less, and as a result it
could be used to undermine the authority of the Court of Session in interpreting Scots Law.[22] When reform did come, it came at the hands of middle class
Scottish Whigs who looked to regenerate Scotland on the model of England, and in the process complete the union by gaining, and they saw it as a gain,
assimilation to England and the British state.[23] The large number of scholars interested in the Scottish Enlightenment have tried to comprehend a developing
society with a cultural vigour which attracted international attention yet lacked political independence. A cultural achievement which, however, its scholarly
admirers concede came to an end about the same time as the independent Scottish constitution.[24] Did each really exist independent of the other? This
historical experience forms an interesting contrast to that of the American republic which achieved political independence in 1783, yet failed to gain cultural
independence until, at the earliest, the 1840's, ironically drawing as much of its English-language cultural development from Scotland as from England itself.[25]
What of 'the actual evidence', as Patrick Riley termed it? Ferguson describes the political constitution of Scotland as it existed at the end of the eighteenth
century in his thesis. While he never dissented from Riley's dismissal of the Scottish nobility, he is less dismissive of the Scottish landed class as a whole, about
whom we still know comparatively little.[26] The detailed work which he and Sunter have carried out does reveal some corruption, but it also reveals a
distinctive political constitution in operation which featured, for example, a far more direct obligation on representatives to be just that in Parliament, where
they were expected to carry out their elector's instructions, rather than act as independent political agents.[27] Many other scholars, less steeped in the
sources, have missed this important point.[28] The History of Parliament Trust volumes on the House of Commons, useful as they are, are imbued with a
'mother-of parliaments' ethos which obscures the general implications of the fine detailed research on Scottish elections carried out by Edith, Lady Haden Guest
and by John M. Simpson.[29] At one point in his thesis Ferguson shrewdly points out that the strong Scottish tradition of literal representation did not die out
with the Union, but that the continuing concern of Scottish M.P.s to serve their electors' interests contributed to their reputation for grasping after patronage in
London.[30] This is a good example of what Ferguson has described in his most recent publication as 'an old, fragmented and scarcely decipherable code' with
which scholars are still attempting to come to terms.[31] We are so used to seeing Scottish politics with English eyes that we have not yet completely identified
what we are looking for.
Scottish political management during the eighteenth century is now more clearly delineated, following Dr. Riley's pioneering work, extended into the eighteenth
century by a number of scholars (including myself). If there was an unwritten Scottish constitution at the end of the seventeenth century, did political
management in English interests contribute to its corruption? Or did that constitutional tradition contribute to the state of semi-independence which Nicholas
Phillipson claimed for Scotland during the eighteenth century? The most recent general history of Scotland comes down on the side of management, or rather
describes the government of eighteenth-century Scotland as a semi-independence in which 'the Scots at least ran their own branch of the spoils system', adding
that 'others, more pessimistic, might well conclude from the same evidence that Scotland was, if not quite a provincial colony, certainly a satellite state.'[32] In
other words, if the Union of the Crowns had been a halfway house which left the Scots in No-Man's Land, the parliamentary union of the eighteenth century
protracted rather than solved the problem, allowing a privileged political elite to enjoy meaningless devolution at the expense of national development. The
real response to this situation was that of the Jacobites, who in Scotland became a party of national independence (no matter how much this can be shown to
be meaningless in relation to the agenda pursued by the royal Stuarts in exile), or on the other hand by the Hanoverian Whigs, dominated by the so-called
Squadrone Party, who sought assimilation to England and the goal of completing the Union.[33] The middle way was the way of those seen by some as cowardly
dissemblers who sought to benefit as they would from each change in political events. This was the way of the old Scottish Court Party, led by the second Duke
of Queensberry after the union, captured by the second Duke of Argyll and his brother the Earl of Ilay after the 1715 rebellion, held by the latter until his death
in 1761, continued briefly by their nephews the third Earl of Bute and James Stuart Mackenzie to 1765 and revived, after a brief hiatus during which political
corruption reached its nadir, by the third Duke of Buccleuch and Henry Dundas, founders of the modern Scottish Tory Party.[34]
These men were not nationalists, if we are looking for nationalists. In many ways Scottish Jacobites might be interpreted as identifying with the fortunes of
what they perceived as a native dynasty in a proto-nationalistic manner. The Squadrone, the Whigs of southeast Scotland, aspired to be managers, or rather
they aspired to be English agents in promoting legal and religious assimilation.[36] Remember that dissenting protestants were an important part in the political
equation of the English Whigs. The Dundas family of Arniston held the Lord Presidency of the Court of Session from 1747 to 1754 and from 1760 right through to
1786 as agents of an English ministry which sought to create a single Whig party in Scotland, including the old court party and the Squadrone.[37] By the time
the Earl of Ilay became third Duke of Argyll he had no opposition to this. He wrote to his chief correspondent in Scotland that he was too old and had too great
a stake in life 'to set myself up again as a Cock to be thrown at', a reference to his work for the Walpole ministry during the Malt Tax crisis of 1725 and the
Porteous Affair of 1737. 'If I act temperately', he also wrote in 1743, it must be a very odd ministry who will not be civil to me, and if I act otherwise, I should
put myself to a great deal of trouble for really I don't know what.'[38] It was the Squadrone Whigs, like Dundas or the third Earl of Marchmont, who tried to keep
the Jacobite witch hunt alive and to portray Argyll as an ambitious Vice Roy, bent spider like at weaving a web of patronage to monopolise power in Scotland.
They convinced the Duke of Newcastle, as they had convinced the Duke of Cumberland, that Argyll
was entirely directed by, or subordinate to, highland influence, and that ... he always retained that principle which obliged him to have recourse
to and depend in some measure upon great highland families who had been declared enemies to the government. [39]
Could this really be said of the chief of the Campbells? Is this really not an indication of the ignorance of Scotland and its history on the part of the Duke of
Newcastle and the Duke of Cumberland and other prominent English politicians and ministers? What does it say about the Squadrone's politics when they can be
seen pandering to these ideas of Scotland?[40]
It can be argued that the Campbells were self-serving lackeys of Walpole up to his fall in 1742, but on the other hand both of the scholars who did most to study
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this period of Scottish government and politics, John Simpson and Richard Scott, concluded that their interest protected Scotland from English excesses,
although their policy was unable to prevent the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745.[41] John Stuart Shaw's work, which is focused on Scotland itself rather than on
government and administration, supports this reading of the evidence. He states that ultimate power resided in London, but nowhere in his book is there
evidence of systematic English interference in Scottish affairs.[42] The Rebellion did not result from a determination for war, but from a last lingering gesture of
loyalty by the majority of the population north of the Clyde and Forth to the country's native dynasty once its forlorn hope appeared and raised his
standard.[43] The third Duke of Argyll protected those he could once the game was up, but no one could accuse him of being subject to the highland interest if
they heard his remarks at the conclusion of the trial of James Stewart at Inveraray; a trial for the murder of a Campbell who was factor for an estate annexed
to the Crown after the '45:
... that this murder has been visibly the effect and consequence of the late rebellion. If you had been successful in that rebellion you had been
now triumphant with your confederates trampling upon the laws of your country, the liberties of your fellow-subjects, and on the Protestant
religion. You might have been giving the law where you now have received the judgement of it; and we, who are this day your judges, might have
been tried before one of your mock courts of judicature, and then you might have been satiated with the blood of any name or clan to which you
had an aversion.[44]
So from one perspective, that of English politicians and Squadrone Lowland Whigs, Argyll was a devious politician ever greedy for more power. From a highland
perspective, he was the agent of the English and the Whigs.
We can learn something of how he saw himself, and how his party saw him, in a series of portraits Allan Ramsay painted of Argyll over a period of almost 20
years, the most important of which was purchased by the town council of Glasgow in 1747 and hung in the Town Council Chambers there. Although another of
Ramsay's portraits is the origin of the visage which stares out at us, very much the commercial Whig, from the bank notes of the Royal Bank of Scotland, it is
the Glasgow portrait which tells us most about his idea of his place in Scottish politics. Argyll is portrayed in his robes as Lord Justice General, Head of the
Court of Justiciary, but the book he holds contains a message about rebellion, history, forgiveness and irony which is not immediately apparent but has been
identified by Dr. John Cairns, Reader in the Department of Private Law at the University of Edinburgh.[45] The book is Sir George Mackenzie's Complete Works,
Vol. One, published in 1716, and the page is open at the beginning of his Pleadings in Some Remarkable Cases Before the Supreme Courts of Scotland. In this
case, Mackenzie defended the Marquis of Argyll, great-grandfather of the third duke, against the charge of treason in 1661. The text at the head of the page
begins 'whether passive compliance in public relations, be punishable as treason.'
In this portrait therefore, the Lord Justice General, head of the Court which executed his great-grandfather, reads his ancestor's defence while clothed in his
robes of office. A further irony is added when we remember that the Marquis of Argyll, as Lord Lorne in 1628 had surrendered his family's hereditary right to the
office of Lord Justice General to the Crown.[46] His unsuccessful defence was before a court over which he had once had the hereditary right to preside, and it
ordered his execution. Almost a century later his descendant would head it again. The presentation of an image harbouring so many ironies of history just a
year after the end of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745/6 provides visual evidence of Argyll's work to limit the damage caused by the rebellion to Scotland, and is
meant to remind the viewer that fortunes can change in History. The judge might one day be the defendant. A theme also present in Argyll's address to James
Stewart for the Appin murder. It is also a coded reference to the passive compliance forced on a defenceless Lowland Scotland by an invading Jacobite army
from the north during 1745 and 1746, and to the importance of the rule of [Scots] Law and the safeguards it provided to liberty and property through the
political union with England. There would be those, such as James Stewart at the Appin trial and the political radicals tried before the Court of Justiciary at the
end of the eighteenth century, who would not have access to these safeguards because they were perceived to be outside this legal tradition through their
opposition to its political basis.
Argyll's obituary contained the pointed reminder that 'his firm attachments to the protestant succession, ... [never appeared] in that invidious scrutiny of party
distinction, by which the divisions of a people are unhappily fomented; and personal importance acquired by exasperating the misfortunes of a country.'[47]
That obituary was written by Argyll's closet confederate Andrew Fletcher, the nephew of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, who held places in the Court of Session
and the Court of Justiciary as Lord Milton (a name he took, significantly, after the Fletcher ancestral estate in Yorkshire). To dismiss both these men as political
hacks is to ignore Fletcher's upbringing and many of the resonances of the actual policy of his and his patron's political careers.[48]
The analysis of the Scottish Tory Party created by Henry Dundas with the help of the third duke of Buccleuch and William Pitt the younger involves some of the
same issues. Did Dundas enslave a nation or defend its interests? This question must be answered with another question - which nation are we discussing? For
the career of Dundas, founded on a determination to save the Scottish constitution from corruption by the new money of the nabobs and their hangers-on, was
transfigured by the need to make common cause with anyone who had property in the face of the revolutionary threat posed by the ideas of Thomas Paine and
the example, at least until 1798, of the French Republic. Dundas ceased to be a national figure in Scotland once Scotland became more than he could
comprehend politically after 1792, but his defence of the Scottish constitution as it had evolved after 1707, for that is what it was, against both Nabob and
radical, meant that Scottish national politics became Tory politics.[49] Reform and the Rights of Man meant reform of Scottish institutions and reform to a
universalist model which in the end made a desert of Scots Law and History and called it reform and progress. One illustration of this is the statement made by
Dundas in one of his letters to Edward Thurlow written at the time of the American Revolution:
It is monstrous indeed that any set of men should be so blind as not to see, or if they do see, so wicked as to contend with one breath, that the
whole mass of the people is luxurious, dissipate and corrupt, and with the same breath to argue that the constitutional powers of that luxurious,
dissipated and corrupt mass should be enlarged.[50]
Who did Dundas mean? He meant those who wanted to extend the political nation rather than defend its constitutional traditions and the political hegemony of
the landed elite.
John Brims has quoted a ballad which was printed and sold in the streets of Edinburgh after the attack on Dundas's house during the King's Birthday riots in
Edinburgh of June 1792 which presented a rather different view of Dundas's philosophy as perceived from the street, having him expound in song:
Wha e'er looks at borough books may find cause to complain,
My way has been to steek my een - the reason's very plain;
All Magistrates are honest men, the Burgesses are thieves,
I like the Corporations, Sirs, think all Reformers knaves.[51]
To reformers, Dundas was defending the indefensible, but Dundas and those he represented amongst the great majority of the landed class were convinced that
they were opposing the anarchy and demagoguery of the mob, as illustrated in the Anti-Popery riots in Edinburgh of 1779, or the pro-French political violence of
the King's Birthday riots in 1792.[52]
The rise of empire, or rather its continued development, and the distractions of the social dislocation attendant on large-scale urbanisation and
industrialisation deferred consideration of the consequences, but it is surely no mistake that once the empire was threatened by Irish Home Rule and Britain
lost its industrial supremacy, the union began to be questioned in Scotland and the move towards executive devolution began.[53] What was lost in the process,
however, was not the idea of semi-independence, but of a Scottish constitution. As our knowledge of it increases, its relevance to modern Scotland should be
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discussed.
To use twentieth-century political values to condemn a feudal monarchy is ahistorical. Even Tom Johnston came to admit that. To identify a distinctive Scottish
political and constitutional tradition is not to argue for a return to feudalism in the twentieth century, but to argue for continuity and coherence in the Scottish
historical tradition. In considering Scottish political history during the eighteenth century, however, we have to decide between two different ways of analysing
the period. Management is a comforting perspective because there are villains in a corrupt nobility and gentry, and to interpret politics as corrupt management
in English service entails a parallel view of the Scottish Enlightenment as an attack on the purity of vernacular culture. Semi-independence is less
straightforward as an idea, but it provides a framework which makes Scotland's participation in the Enlightenment comprehensible, and it can accommodate an
explanation of why Jacobite activity in Scotland continued until the 1750s. Semi-independent Scotland could shield its anti-unionist elements from English
witch-hunts without rejecting the union itself, and in time the situation did change to one where no one wanted to be a Jacobite any more. The third Duke of
Argyll's statements, verbal and visual, indicate just how much he was aware that what had happened in history was by no means inevitable. Whigs in Scotland
were divided between a Squadrone who wanted to become English and a Court Party who after 1707 may have hoped to contain Jacobites rather than eliminate
them, but who realised that Jacobites in Scotland were Scots first and Jacobites second. To hunt them down and eliminate them would be to descend again to
the worst excesses of the civil war of the preceding century. It is not often realised that one of the excesses stopped by Argyll and Lord Milton was a plan to
colonise the annexed Jacobite estates with English farmers after 1750.[54] Henry Dundas came from a Squadrone political family, but he adopted Scottish Court
policy by his interest in Scottish electoral reform and in his analysis of the social context of emigration from Scotland in 1775.[55] When he arranged to have the
Jacobite annexed estates returned to their families in 1784, he was returning to a policy of which the Duke of Argyll would have approved.
The beginning of the end of the Scottish semi-independent state began in 1785, when those interested in Scottish Burgh Reform could find no one amongst the
Scottish representatives in parliament to take up their cause after the Court of Session refused to act. Even the most reformist of all the Scottish M.P.s, George
Dempster, felt that he could not introduce a bill which would call for the end of the electoral system which had elected him.[56] Henry Dundas was more
interested in the county franchise than the burghs. In the end, on the advice of Charles James Fox, the burgh reformers went to George Brinsley Sheridan in
England (who of course was Irish) and having gone to an M.P. for an English seat (although not an Englishman) to achieve change, the precedent was set. Once a
revival of a reform movement amongst the propertied classes began again after 1802, its leaders not only looked to make a political nation based on property
more secure by extending its membership, but realised that it would be impossible to achieve this within the old Scottish constitution, and moved instead to an
alliance with reformers in England.[57] An optimistic attempt to interpret the 'Radical War' of the 1820's as national has attracted little support.[58] Radical
opinion looked to English reform or French revolution for its paradigm of the future. This was the inglorious but necessary end to the twilight of the ancient
Scottish constitution in its last phase of semi-independence, but to dismiss its history from 1707-1792 as management is simplistic. The wars against Napoleon
utterly transformed the context of British politics, as can be seen from the research presented in books as disparate as Thompson's Making of the English
Working Class and Colley's Britons.
The problem for the reformers and assimilationists was that once you turned your back on your own history there was little room for you in someone else's. A
truth demonstrated by the difficulties entailed in obtaining modern Scottish legislation from a Parliament in which the majority of M.P.s are not Scots. The
attempt to create a greater Britain provided a structure, as did the idea of a Commonwealth which the Scots Earl of Rosebery invented in the 1870's,[59] as does
the European Community today. The American James Baldwin, looking to his own lost history out of Africa, wrote that 'once you know where you have come
from, there really is no limit to where you can go.'[60] The idea of semi-independence in eighteenth century Scotland is a signpost to a history which later
disappeared, and which is now in the process of being recovered. Colin Kidd's recent work, for example, has opened up an entirely new perspective on this
idea.[61] There are new opportunities to link the study of Scotland's government to wider aspects of its history during the eighteenth century which may help us
link its political history to its cultural achievements (and disappointments) in a way which will help overcome barriers that have divided the study of its history
in the past.
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